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Abst rac t - -Th is  paper suggests a general perception-baaed theory of representation within the 
framework of the phenomenology of C. S. Pelrce (named by him "phaneroscopy") by means of the 
generalization of R. Wille's basic lattice-concepts theory of objects and their attributes. 
We first summarize Peirce's main categorization f all n-uric relations into three fundamental kinds: 
Firstness, Secondness and Tlfirdness {i.e., relations requiring monads, dyads and triads, respectively, 
in their definitions). His "reduction thesis" reduces all relations of higher adicity into these three 
kinds. 
We then use elementary Category Theory to develop "relation-structures" of concepts, relations 
and lfigher order relations, baaed entirely on experienced simple "qualities of feeling." A relational 
algebra restalts which includes semantic nets as relation-structures. In terms of this algebra we use 
Peirce's "reduction theorem" in order to build a "foliation" of all conceptual/relational-structures 
by men,is of levels ("sheets") algebraically defined. This provides a canonical "normal form" for 
networks of n-adic relations. Tiffs can be done to existing senumtic network formalisms to help make 
sense of phenomenologlcaily confused components. 
AnMogously to Wille's lattice-concepts theory connecting objects and attributes, we define "repre- 
scntatlon-contexts" connecting two corresponding classes of phenomena formalized in terms of Cat- 
egory Theory by diagrmns in a category we call relational structures provided with natural trmlsfor- 
mations as morplfisnm. This leads us to a follated conception of semantic networks with ear l  concept 
a~ld relation a~signed to a particular phenomenologlcal level. Tlnm a foliated network represents 
not only a state of tldngs but also the mode of connection of the network with the state of things. 
One consequence of foliation is that we now have a method for relational subsumption using the 
generallzation-hierarchy of relations. 
In addition to the insight afforded by this formal analysis, we also obtain a lattice of representation- 
relations which may be computationally used as an IS-A hierarchy sub-element for the purpose of 
m,tomatic ilfference, in all subject-domains involving representation. 
1. INTRODUCTION 
When we examine xamples of semantic networks from the phenomenological point of view--that 
is to say in trying to categorize what Charles S. Peirce called the "modes of being" of the network 
concept-nodes a well as relations, we are struck by the enormous diversity and confusion which 
holds good as much for the nodes as for the relations. 
Thus Winograd [1] (see Figure 1) mixes together singular beings (Kazuo, Fido) and intentional 
concepts ue|, as person, dog, animal, cow, meat, which are of very different kinds since it is clear 
that "Fido" is an example of the concept "dog"--but "dog" is a sub-concept of the super-concept 
"animal." "Meat" does not have the extension which we would give it if it were not linked with 
"cow" by the relation "gives" which implicitly totally restricts its extension to "meat of a cow." 
There are many such distinctions which a simple node-and-arc notation fails to make. The at- 
tribution of qualities or properties by the relation "is" (Bagheera is black) introduces another kind 
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Figure 1. A fragment of Winograd's semantic network in which numy node and rink 
types are phenomenologically cord'used. 
of node and relation. At least five 1 different meanings of the term "concept" can be distinguished 
in the fields of Artificial Intelligence and Computer Science. 
D. J. Israel [5] is so conscious of the problems which arise from the diversity of elements in 
semantic networks that he considers it necessary to distinguish between the natures and qualities 
of things." 
"There is to be one tree for kinds of things and another for qualities of 
things. Kinds must be distinguished from qualities: being a cat must 
be distinguished (in kind, no doubt) from being red." 
For those who are familiar with the phenomenology of Charles Sanders Peirce (which we call 
"phaneroscopy "2) these terms--"concepts," "kinds of things," "singular beings" and "qualit ies"-- 
immediately bring to mind the three universes which are distinguished by him as three "modes 
of being" of which the subjects are respectively: 
1. Ideas or Possibles (potential qualities uch as redness), which can be described using only 
monadic predicates (. is red, _ is a cat). 
2. Existents and the Facts concerning these existents, which can he described using only 
monadic and dyadic predicates (for instance, the fact: "the cat eats the mouse" is described 
by the combination of the monadic predicates "_ is a cat" and "_ is a mouse" and of the 
dyadic predicate "_ eats _"). 
3. Nece~itant~ (laws, habits and concepts), defined using only monadic, dyadic and triadic 
predicates (for instance, the concept of "sale" instanciated in the fact John sells a book 
to Mary can be described by the predicates "_ is a seller," "_ is a book," "_ is a buyer," 
"_ makes a transaction with _," "_ sells _ to _"). 
Thee  three Universes are determined by the three fundamental categories of phenomenological 
elements (Phanerons in Peircean terminology) called respectively: Firstness, Secondness and 
1See [2]. Moreover, J. P. Desdes [3] when analysing the use of the relation "is" in Indo-European languages, brings 
to our attention the values of Ioca~tion, identification, ingred~ence snd possession as well as the attributive 
values 0f belonging ~nd inclusion. The form~ algebrsic deflation of the "concept" taken from R. Wille's notion of 
"context" [4] which we will take into account later, should be added to the five meanings enumerated by Rastler. 
This one seems to be completely isolated from the other five--yet another illustration of the gulf which exists 
between formal and empirical sciences. 
~We use Peirce's own term out of respect for his concern for "moral terminology." toe ing  that he who invents 
something hu  the right to name it. ~nd others hould use that name. Generally. because this network theory had 
its origins out, de the standard ones in Artificial Intelligence. the terminology used may be unfamiliar, ,although 
in most cases there axe parallel terms in formalisms uch as, for example, John Sowa's Conceptual Graphs. 
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Thirdness. As we shall see, there is no corresponding need for any further "universes" such as 
Fourthness, Fifthness, etc. On this foundation a whole philosophy is built; see, for instance, [6]. 
Without going any deeper into the Peircean philosophy, we suggest hat "phaneroscopy," the 
categorization of concepts and relations into the Peircean classes, would introduce an important 
taxonomic principle into the theory of semantic networks. This could be used to formalize 
distinctions among the present competing representations of the things we know, and could 
hasten the solution of problems which arise from the phenomenological disorder which seems to 
reign in the networks. Semantic networks, forming part of an "artificial phenomenology" (the 
computer thus being considered as a quasi-mind in the Peircean sense), would have everything 
to gain from integrating Peircean phaneroscopy. 
We are not going to try to compare different families of semantic networks from the point 
of view of Peirce's phaneroscopy or the Peircean semiotics which we have set out in [7]. Such 
a project would seem premature. However, the algebraic nature of our formalisations makes it 
easier to establish a connection through generalisations between Peirce's phaneroscopy and senti- 
otics on the one hand, and Rudolf Wille's theory of lattice-concepts on the other, which provides 
a fortnal basis for categorization, subsumption and inference in semantic networks (reading the 
articles by Burch and by Wille in this volume, before reading this one, is highly recommended). 
This work combines ubjects which are apparently very disparate: perception theory, Peircean 
phenomenology and relational algebra, Category Theory, Wille's lattice-concept theory, and se- 
mantic networks. Thus, virtually every reader will have to master some alien terminology. 
2. CONCEPTUAL STH, UCTURES BASED ON PERCEPT ION 
In the next section we will formalize Peirce's elementary perception theory ill terms of relational 
algebraic structures. We require an empirical base for our attempt to create a model of tile process 
of acquisition, memorisation, representation attd conltnunication f knowledge. For that we nlust 
take into account in oue way or another the essential nature of human experience: the fact that 
man's relationship to the world around hint comes through his perceptive faculties. Because his 
knowledge is determined by his perceptiotLs, whether it comes tltrough direct perception of the 
physical world or througli the perception of non-physical reality transmitted through "signs" in 
the physical world, the forms this knowledge takes depend on the forms of the perception itself. 
Therefore, a scientillc approach to the question must either adopt attd integrate a theory of 
perception itl its development, even in embryonic form, or justify its independence of the nature 
of perception. We are in favour of the first possibility. We will consider the results of Peirce's 
"abstractive observation" of what tie calls a "percipuum" [8, CP 7-629], a that is to say a singular 
fact of perception. Peirce analyzes it as being the juxtaposition of a percept and a perceptual 
judgement. "['lie percept is the simple sensation and the perceptual judgement is the fitting of 
that sensatioa into a structure of sensations. This is in concordance with concepts commotdy 
accepted today concerning perception, which is described as a process in which the subjects not 
only choose the elements of the percept, but also the way in which they should be arranged in 
order to constitute the perceived whole. These simple "qualities of feelings" are directly produced 
by stimuli coming from the world outside and they are selected according to their "pregnance" 
and 'Torcefulness"--that is to say according to the subject's more or less developed receptivity 
based on his previous experiences or on the natural capacity of the stimulus to impose itself on 
the subject's perceptions by its own power. Perceptual judgentents are produced in the subject's 
own interior world and in essence they consist of bundles of qualities of feeling which constitute 
a sort of unit of a superior order. 
Such units form semantic nets. J. F. Sowa [9] explains it as "a conceptual graph which describes 
the way percepts are assembled." In visual perception, for example, the existence of ambivalent 
images proves that a single percept (a single group of qualities of feeling produced by an inaage as 
a source of visual stimuli) can be arranged by two distinct perceptual judgements, and because 
of this can generate two distinct mental entities. Accordingly, sets of qualities of feeling on the 
one hand, and bundles of these qualities of feeling which are linked together by a complex group 
3p, eferences to CP are followed by volume and paragraph numbers; they refer to The Collected Papers of Charles 
$. Peiree. 
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of relationships on the other hand, will be our empirical universals associated with perception 
phenomena. 
One can consider that all perceptual judgements occur as families of uninterpreted n-adic 
predicates of which the blanks (or place markers) are occupied by the simple qualities of feeling. 
These will be taken into account in our model as an abstract set sufficiently large to allow all the 
qualities of feeling present in a given perceived fact to be identified with interrelated subsets of the 
"big set" or power-set 2" of all possible combinations of n qualities of feeling. All sets taken into 
consideration i what follows will be such subsets. The perceptual judgement which organizes and 
arranges them can be made to correspond perfectly with the mathematical definition of relational 
structure as given below. 
3. FORMAL CATEGORY-THEORETIC  DEVELOPMENT OF 
OBJECTS IN THE WORLD 
Using a methodological epistomological process, we now will associate specific mathematical 
universals with these empirical universals. We will use elementary Category Theory in order to 
formalize Peircean phenomenology, because Category Theory allows us to treat in a principal 
way the objects of the world, and, at the same time, the relations that they have with other 
objects. (For introductions to Category Theory see [10-12]). The Category-Theoretic notation 
used in this paper is taken from Ad~imek's Theory of Mathematical Structures in which the study 
of categories of relational structures is developed. 
DEFINITION 1. A relatioual st ructure of type n is a pa/r (X, a) where X is a set ,~d a is 
an n-adic relation on X ,  that is to say a subset of the Cartesian product X n. 
DEFINITION 2. More generally, a relational structure of type [nl]w.I where each ni is a 
positive integer, is a pair (X, {ai}iei) where X is a set and {ai}iEl a family of ni-adic relations. 
The type {hi } is the arity-size of all participating relations in the "family." The i subscript allows 
there to be several different arity-sizes (each n-adic relation is like an n-ended directed hyperarc 
in a hypergaph). 
Indeed, the qualities of feeling caused by exter,lal stimuli or by mnemonic reminder corresponds 
to the elements of X, and each bundle of qualities of feeling linked togetl,er by a perceptual 
judgeme,,t corresponds to an ni-tuple of ai. In addition, the following defi,fition corresponds 
to the unity of perceptual fact relative to an identified object of the exterior world (which itself 
appears always as an entity), by means of the introduction of a connectivity condition on the 
family {ai}. 
DEFINITION 3. A relational structure (X ,a )  of type {ni}iE ! is connected if for all pairs of 
elements z and z' E X there exists a subset of the family {ai} called (a,,a~ . . . . .  a~.) and 
elements =l, z~, . . . ,  x~-l  of X such that z and xl belong to an n-tuple of a , ,  =, and x~ belong 
to an n-tuple ofa~. . . . .  , xk- i  and z' to an n-tuple ofak. (This generalizes the connectivity of a 
graph to a directed hypergraph.) 
Now, the relations between physical or non-physical objects of the world (for instance, simi- 
larities, identities, type/token relations, etc.) can be naturally taken into account by morphisms 
between connected relational structures (CRS), which are defined as follows: 
DEFINITION 4. Let (X, a) and (Y, 13) be two relational structures of the same type n. A function 
F of X into Y is said to be compat ib le i f(=,, z2, . . . ,  xn) E a implies that (F(xl), F(z.~), . . . ,  
F(x~)) E fl (i.e., membership of a node in a relation hyperarc is preserved). 
Now we begin to use Category Theory considering a functor F of the category "Set" of the 
sets within itself, and defining a relational structure of type F as a pair (X, a) where X is a set 
and a C_ F(X); if (Y,~) is another elational structure of type F, the function F of X into Y is 
F-compatible if FlU(a)] C_ ~. The category of these relational structures with these morphisms 
will be called "relational category $(F)." Then the relational category of type n is $(Qn) where 
Qn is the functor defined by F(X)  = X a and F(F) = F '~. If LIi~,,Qn, is the coproduct 4 of 
4The symbol I  indicates the coprod~¢t ofa series, which here means disjoint union, also represented by 'plus' 
signs. 
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the functors Qm(i E I) we obtain the relational category $(I.L~tQ,~,) of which the objects 
are defined in Definition 3 and the morphisms in Definition 4. For instance, in 5(Q2 + Qa), a 
relational structure on a set X is a set a C X x X + X x X x X consisting of a dyadic relation 
a,. = a N X x X and a triadic relation a3 = a n X x X x X; given the two relational structures 
of type Q~. + Qa the compatible maps F : (X, a) - ,  (Y,/3) are precisely those which preserve the 
dyadic relations as well as the triadic ones, i.e., (x0,xl) E a.~ implies (F(x0),F(xt)) E f12 and 
(xo,xt,x2) E a3 implies (r(xo),F(xt),F(x2)) E ~3. The specific mathematical universal chosen 
will be the category $(I.Iiet Qm), the exclusive framework of our formalisation: it contains, in 
fact, with a suitable set of index I, all forms of all possible perceptual judgements of all subjects 
and also all possible relations that these forms maintain between themselves. 
Consensus Reality as 'Initial Structure' 
Before proceeding with the main development, let us consider the surmised reality which lies 
behind multiple (possibly different) perceptions of an object, event or situation. All the relational 
categories $(F) possess an interesting property which again requires two definitions: 
DEFINITION 5. A source in S(F) on a set :C is a family (Yi, fli, ~i)iEI where the (Yi, 13i) are 
objects of $(F) and the Fi : X --. ~ are maps; we usually denote sources as follows {X ---. 
(L,/3~)}~I. 
DEFINITION 6. An init ial s t ructure  era source is a structure (X, a) on X such that: 
(i) Fi : (,\', a) - -  (~q, ~3i) is a morphism orS(F) 
(ii) for each object (T, 6) and each fimction h : T ---. X such that Fi.h : (T, 6) ---, (Yi, /3i) is a 
morphism for each i, then h : (T, 6) .--, (X, a) is also a morphi.sm. 
Pitol,osrrmN I. Adf.tnek [10] The relational category $( F) is initiMly cornplcte, that is to say 
ever)" source possesses a unique initial structure. 
In fact, a = I'][F(I'i)]-t(/3i) = {x e F(X); F(Fi)(x) E /3i for i E I} is the required initial 
structure. 
This h~ the following consequences for us: We have a subject (the perceiver) with a set of 
perceptual judgements relative to an external object (i.e., a network arrangement of bundles of 
simple qualities of feeling) formalized by objects (Yi, fli) of the relational category $(I_L~/Q,,i). 
Considering the intersection (supposed not to be empty) X of the Yi and the inclusion maps 
X ---- )q we obtain a source on X. Proposition 1 assures us of the existence of a relational 
structure (X, a) which is incorporated in each (Yi,/3/). We naturally identify (X,a)  with the 
structure of the object for this subject; (X,a)  corresponds formally to the "object behind the 
appearances" of the phenomenologists. Of course (X, a) depends on the (Yi, fli), that is to say 
the totality of the experience that this subject has of the perceived object. It is possible to build 
a new source associated with a set of perceiving subjects (a community) taking intersections of
underlying sets X of each structure (X,a)  presumably built by every subject. Proposition 1 
permits us again to assert he existence of a unique relational structure which can be interpreted 
as the structure of the object collectively elaborated by the community in question (see Figure 2). 
This is the "common knowledge" of the community members about the object, or the common 
conception of it. 
This gives us considerable power, because from the phenomenological point of view developed 
in the next section, it is the Peircean notion of "skeleton-set" [8, CP 7-426] or the llusserlian 
notion of "eidos" which we algebraicize in that way. That is the reason why we call this initial 
structure an "eidetic structure." For example, in Figure 3, we have the eidetic structure of the 
French flag. 
4. THE COMPOSIT IONAL STRUCTURE OF THE "PHANERON"  
Our fundamental hypothesis consists precisely in interpreting the eidetic structure obtained in 
the previous ection in a phenomenological sense. To this end it will suffice to consider that an 
¢ ,~."~ A 23-6 /9 - t l  
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Figure 2. An eideti¢ structure for reality lies behin,l different perceptions of it. 
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Figure 3. The lette~ "i" represent relations of inherence (of the color to the matter) 
and the letters "a" relations of "adjacence" between two rectangles which have a 
conunon side. 
object is "present o the mind ''5 if and only if this mind "forms" its eidetic structure. Indeed, 
since this structure is included (that is to say present) in each perceptual judgement (mental 
semantic network) of every member of the community, we automatically obtain its "presence to 
tile mind." For every perceiving entity there is a one-to-one correspondence b tween perceived 
objects of tt, e world and a set of connected relational structures of $(LIi~t Q-,)- This point of 
view agrees perfectly with the principle of the "identity theory" enunciated by Jackendoff [14]: 
"the distinction between mental and physical events is purely one of mode of description." 
The morphisms between eidetic structures are naturally interpreted as relations between world 
objects. Finally this modelization consists in substituting for the exterior world, considered 
SThis hypothesis is also considerably substantiated by neurophysical considerations. Indeed the "mental object" 
is identified by J. P. Changeux [13] with the physical state created by the electrical and chemical activity of large 
"assemMies" of neurons, mathematically described by a graph, discrete, close and autonomous. Now, ea~cah neuron 
is forrmdly equivalent o n-adlc relations between the other neurons belonging to the assembly with which it is 
linked. Therefore, it seems right to consider that this assembly is, formally a connnected relational structure. 
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as a "vague" category with objects and relations between these objects, the precise category 
S(I.~iEI Qn,) with the aid of a "metaphorical functor" supported by the mechanism of the per- 
ception of the exterior world itself. This functor is created, so to speak, from the very fact of the 
perception of objects and of their relations. 
The objects of the world are, most of the time, present to the mind simultaneously with 
other objects, if only through their own constituent parts with which they are related. In other 
words the objects participate in what Peirce calls a "phaneron" (synonymous for him with "phe- 
nomenon"). The phaneron is ~the collective total of all that is in any way or in any sense present 
to the mind, quite regardless of whether it corresponds to any real thing or not" [8, CP 1-284]. 
According to the previous hypothesis, it follows that a phaneron can be produced by the percep- 
tion of a set of related objects of the exterior world, or internally constituted by tile mind which 
associates their eidetic structures already memorized, or by a combination of both. These eidetic 
structures are combined by means of their possible morphisms. (Changeux speaks of "associative 
properties of mental objects.") Again using Category Theory, we will build the fornml framework 
for dealing with the phaneron (phenomenology), that is to say the structure of all that can be 
present o the mind. 
Before that, we will establish a reduction theorem and give a few definitions (in keeping with 
the philosophical speculations and tile formal intuitions of C. S. Peirce) which permit us to 
describe more easily tile phaneron and tile relations between phanerons. 
DEFINITION 7. Let (X, a) be a relational structure of type n on base-set X and (X, /3) a rela- 
tional structure of type m on the same base-set; we define the re lat ive product  of (X, a) by 
(X,/3), and we call ( X,  a */3) the relatiot, al structure of type n + m - 2 de/tried by the following 
subset of the Cartesian-product set of X"+'"-~': 
a */3 = {(st, ~-., . . . ,  z , , - t ,  V2 . . . .  , Vm)} such timt there exist u E X 
such that (xt, x2 . . . . .  x . - t ,  u) E a attd (u, Y2 . . . .  , y,,,) E/3. 
DEFINITION 8. A relational structure (X, a) is re lat ive ly  decomposa l f le  on a set K = {(X, 
tri)}ifit of  relational structures if (X, a) is the relative product of a set of relationM structures 
of K. 
DEFINITION 9. A relational structure (X, a) of type n is re lat ive ly  reduct ib le  on X if anti 
only i f (X ,  a) is relatively decomposable on a set K = {(X, ai)}i~t of relational structures on X 
of type smal ler  than n. Ira relational structure is not relatively reductible on X it is re lat ive ly  
i r reduet ib le  on X. 
It is ea.sy to establish that every relational structure of a type equal to 3 or smaller titan 3 is 
relatively irreductible within any donmin. 
TEIEOrtEM 1. Let (X, a) be a relational structure of type n > 3 and oo a set of the same 
cardinality as a; we consider Xo = X U ao and the relational structure (Xo, a) to be of type n 
defined on Xo by the n-tuples ofa .  Then (Xo, a) is relatively reductible on a set of relational 
structures of type 3. 
PRoot~ (n = 4): Let ¢ : u - -  ao abijection of a onto ao. We call ¢(.et, x.%xa, x4) = x ° the 
corresponding element of (zl,  z_~, J:a, z4) E a. We define two triadic relations oil Xo by: 
at = {(zl, z2, z ' )  such that (st, z~., za, x. 0 E a} 
a~ = {(x', xa, x4) such that (xt, z.~, xa, z4) E a}. 
We form the relative product at * a2 and let (Yt, Y~., Ya, Y4) E at  * a~. 
There exists u E Xo such that (yt, y~., u) E at and (u, ya, y4) E a.~ and there are (yt, y2, za, z4) 
E a and (zt, z~., Ya, Y4) E a. 
Clearly, since ¢t is a bijection and ¢(yt, y.~, za, z4) = ¢(zt, z_., 93, y4) = u, we get gt = zt, 
y.~ = z~., za = Ya, z4 = 94. Hence (Yt, y-.,zz, z4) = (zt, z~.,ya, y4) = (Yt, Y~.,ya, y4) E or. We 
conclude that at  * a.~ C_ a; a C at * a~. is obvious and we have a = at * a..z. 
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There is no difficulty in extending this proof to n > 4 considering the n - 2 triadic relations 
defined as follows: 
at = {(xl, ~.~, x ' )  such that (xt, z~, . . . ,  zn) E a} 
a.~ = {(z', za, x ' )  such that (st, z_% . . . ,  z,,) E a} 
a,,_.~ = {(x', Zn-l,  Z,) such that (zt, x.~, . . . ,  z , )  E a} 
where 0(xl, z~ . . . . .  Xn) = Z'. The method used above is in accordance with the principles 
enunciated by C. S. Peirce in [15]. 
This reduction thesis 6 proved differently in terms of extensional logic by H. G. Herzberger [16] 
and in terms of intentional logic by R. W. Butch [17] seems to be in opposition to a well known 
result of W. V. O. Quine [18] according to which every n-adic predicate can be reduced to a 
combination of dyadic predicates. This discussion has no place in this work, but we note simply 
that it is, in our opinion, a difference of viewpoint as to the importance accorded to the notion 
of "teridentity" (see [17,19] and the article by R. W. Butch in this volume). 
Now, the reduction theorem allows us to describe every relational structure on X of type n 
by means of the relative product of relational structures of type 1, 2 or 3, called elementary 
relational structures. We call "monads" the elements of relational structures of type 1 (l-tuples); 
we call "dyads" the ones of type 2 (2-tuples) and "triads" the ones of type 3 (3-tuples). Each 
monad corresponds to a simple "quality of feeling," each dyad to an existent imlividual or a fact, 
and each triad to a "concept, law or something expressible by universal proposition." This is the 
empirical decomposition of the phaneron into indecomposable elements many a time describe,I 
by Peirce. 
If (X, a) is an eidetic structure of an object of type {ni}i~t, by introducing enough new 
individuals like a0 for every n~ > 3 such that X U {new individuals} = X0, we can consider 
that every object of the world is represented in our model by a relational strtlct.ure of S(Qt + 
Q-.+ Qa) that is to say a relational structure of type { l, 2, 3}. []ul., considering that the perceptual 
judgement which assembles n qualities of feeling of tm n-tuple assembles afortiori all the k-tuphrs 
(n < k) obtained erasing n - k of these qualities of feeling, we dellne a special relational structure 
of type { I, 2, 3} as follows: 
DEFINrrloN 10. A relational structure (X, a) of type {1,2,3} on the set X with at = e~tq X,  
a~. = a f'l X x X ,  aa = a CI X x X x X is a phenomenolog ica l  s t ruc ture  of type {1,2,3} if 
the following conditions are fulfilled: 
(i) i f ( z t ,  x~., ca) E an, then (xl, x..,) E a?, (xl, xa) E a.~, (x.~, xa) E a~ 
(ii) i f ( z t ,  x2) E a~., then zl 6 at and z2 E at. 
By combination of (i) and (ii) we have: 
(iii) i f ( z t ,  z~., z3) E as, then zt E at ,  x2 E at,  and za E at.  
PROpOSlTIOS 1. The relations R3,~. defined by the above condition (i) between aa ~Jd a..,, R..,,t 
defined by (i 0 between a~. and al ,  Ra,t defined by (iii) between a3 and at, define a category 
eThe interest of a reduction thesis lies not only in the result and its con.sequences but also in the mechanism of proof 
ha.~ed on the addition to every n-tuple of ~ of a new element wlfich corresponds to the "quality of feeling" of the n- 
tuple itself. This element can be interpreted as the partial determination ol" the mind which precisely constitutes 
this n-tuple in a greater entity in the perceptu~d judgement. This establishes a correspondence between the 
"external" relation structure (built by the community) and the "internal" structure in whidl all adicit i~ (arities) 
have been increased by 1. This correspondence is defined as follows: 
Moreover, this interpretation Allows us to conceive the external structure as a ca,,se of the internal structure in 
a dialectic process (see [7]). Then, eidetlc structures can be interpreted as causal structures assigned to external 
objects the forms of wlfich are imposed by the specific mechanisms of the perception. This remark also justifies the 
removal of the division between an external category and an internal category, the former becoming a subcategory 
of the latter. Therefore, we can consider that the external category contains objects without physical materiality. 
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called aa --  a2 --  al  of which objects are the an, a2, and al and the morphisms Ra.~, R2.t, Ra,l 
and the identities on an, a~, and al .  
Indeed we have Ra.1 = R~..loRap.. Henceforth, we will represent the phenomenological structure 
associated to an object- of the world by (X, aa --  a~ --  a l )  where X is a set and aa --" aa - -  al  
the category defined in Proposition 1. We recall that, if X and Y are two sets, a functional 
correspondence b tween X and Y is a relation F C_ X x Y such that if z E X, (z,y) E F, and 
(x, : )  E r then V = :. 
DEFINITION 11. Let (X, aa --. a~ --  a l )  and (Y, Ba "-' fl-~ -" flz) two phenomenological struc- 
tures and F a functional correspondence b tween X and Y; we consider the following sets: 
r(3, 3) = {(r(xt), F(x~.), F(x3)) E ~a such that (zt, x~, za) E an} 
such that (xt, x~., x3) E an} 
F(3, 1) = ((r(x,)  e Bt, r(x.~) e ~, r(xa) e ~l such that (xt, z~., xa) E an} 
ro ,  2) = ( ( r (~) ,  r(~.~)) e ~. such that (xt, z2) e e~2} 
r(~, I) - ( ( r (~)  ~ ~,  r(~.~) ~ ~ such that (~, ~.) ~ ~'2} 
r(1, 1) = ((r(~,) ~ ~,  such that (~)  ¢ ,~,} 
and the corresponding relations (called elementary morphisms) 
ra : ,~  - .  r(3,a) c_ ~;  r~ : ,,~ - .  r(~,~) c_ ~.; r~ : ,~  - .  r (3 ,1 )  c_ ~,  
r~ : ~ - .  r (2 ,~)  c_ ~. ;  r "  : ~ .  - .  r (2 ,  t )  c_ ~.~, 
t'~ :c~ - -  r ( t , l )  c_ ~t. 
l" is called a phenomeuologica l  morph ism if r determines a functor of the category aa --. 
(~. ,~ ~ into the category ]3a B', /3t by means of the relations Fa, r~a, r'~, rz, "' rt. 
For instance, the fimctional correspondences F are such that we have the following commutative 
diagrams which are phenon|enological morl~hisnrs: 
r3 l / F2 I"1 
1~3--~ Ih -->- I~1 
PItOPOSITION 2. There are exactly 10 phenomenological morphisms between two phenomeno- 
IogicM structures; these phenomenological morphisms are ordered in a structure of lattices by the 
naturM transformations of functors. 
Indeed it will suffice to write the 10 functors and to note the pairs of these functors for which 
a natural transformation is defined. 
PrtoPosrnoN 3. The set of tl~e phenomenological structures provided with the phenomenological 
morphisms i a category called the Phenomeuolog ica l  Category  of  the Objects  PH0. 
Indeed the composition of phenomenological morphisms is defined by the composition of the 
functional correspondences combined with the composition of the functors. 
The interpretatio,i of these definitions and results are as follows: the phenomenological struc- 
tures represent he objects of the world (present o the mind), whereas the phenomenological 
morphisms represent he relations between these objects, that is to say the modes of being. 
There are six funda,nental c asses of modes of being: Fa, r~, and Fg corresponding respectively 
to Authentic Thirdness, Degenerate Thirdness at the first degree, Degenerate Thirdness at the 
second degree; r2 and r[ corresponding respectively to Authentic Secondness and degenerate 
Secondness; rt  corresponding to Firstness. 
These modes of being correspond with the so-called "cenopythagorean categories "~ of Peirce 
and their degenerated forms (see [20]). Moreover these results agree perfectly with the results of 
rPythagoreans, followers of Pythagoras, assigned eep mystical significance to certain low integers. Peirce reMised 
that he was doing the same! 
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It. W. Butch ([17] and ill this volume). Moreover, if F( i , j )  is not empty, then F(i ' , j ')  with i' < i 
and j '  < j is not empty; therefore the presence in a phenomenological structure of a mode of 
being corresponding to ['(i, j) implies the presence of a mode of being corresponding to P(i',j'). 
In fact the modes of being are organized in a lattice of six elements and this framework permits 
us to develop a complete formalization and various extensions of the Peircean semiotic [7]. 
For example, referring to a net proposed by Touretzky [21, p. 199] which will be considered 
below, we have for the triadic relation "1 prefers 2 to 3" (see the left side of Figure 4). 
Now we note ill Figures 4 and 5 that tile feelings of the elephants for the cars are an independent 
reality of their feelings for the motorcycles. It is realized in acts (in the physical world including 
the mind's acts, i.e., Secondness) and represented in Figure 4 in an iconic linguistic manner 
(i.e., physical relation of proximity with a graphical link between the common nouns "Elephant" 
and "Car"). However we must note, with respect to this example, that we are obliged to use 
a linguistic representation, that is to say that we are speaking of the phenomenology within a 
special (linguistic) phenomenology. The notion of representation-context (see below) will allow 
us to take into account this difficulty. 
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Now we have something corresponding to a phaneron considered as a collective totality of 
objects present to the mind with relations between these objects. In our model, the phaneron 
will be represented by a 'diagram' in the phenomenological category of objects PH0. 
DEFINITION 12. Let J be a poser considered as a category; we cal/ "category of phanerons 
of  type  J" the category PHj of which objects are diagrams of scheme J oil PH0, that is to say 
covariant functors D : J ~ PH0, and the morphisms are natural transformations of functors. 
Remember that a natural transformation of functors h : D --, D' is a family of morphisms 
(h(j) : D(j) --  D'(j))jE$ such that, for each morphism ejk of J,  we have the commutative 
diagram: 
D(j) , D(k) 
1 l 
O'(ej~) 
D'(j) , D'(k) 
(ej~ EHom(j,k)) 
We have moved up another level. For a suitable poset J, we can obtain all possible forms 
of configurations of objects which can be present o any mind, that is to say all abstract forms 
of phanerons. These forms are determined a priori by the forms of the perception, present 
perceptions or previously memorized perceptions. 
Now, we are able to approach the phenomenology of representation in formal terms, h| a 
representation one collective totality stands for another, that is to say that one phenomenon 
is substituted for another. Therefore, in our model a diagram is substituted for another. The 
complex relations that these two totalities can have in the exterior world are clearly represented 
by the corresponding connections of diagrams. A representation theory is consequently possible 
using the categories of phanerons PHj.  In this way the problem of the representation f knowledge 
by means of semantic networks can be reduced, because we have the possibility of "foliation" by 
means of our elementary sub-networks. 
5. EXTENDING CONCEPT-LATT ICES BEYOND ATTRIBUTES TO RELATIONS 
To that end we are going to generalize the notions of context and of lattice concepts uch as 
they are defined by R. Wille [4] as follows: 
A contezt is a triple (G, M, I) where G is a set of objects, M is a set of attributes, and I is 
a binary relation between G and M indicating by gIm that the object g has tile attribute m. 
There is a natural Galois connection between G and M (which we indicate with "prime" marks) 
defined by A' = {me MlgIm for all g e A} for A C G, and B' = {g E G[gIm for all m E B} 
for B C M. A concept of thecontcxt (G,M, I )  is apair  (A,B) with ACG,  B C M,A '  = B, 
and B' = A. The set L(G, M, I) of the concepts of (G, M, I) is partially ordered by the definition 
(A1, B~) < (A.,, Be) if and only if .41 C_ A, (or Bt D_ B,.,). (L(G, M, I), <) is a complete lattice 
called the lattice-concept of (G, M, I). Wille's concept-lattices are described in his article in this 
volume. From our standpoint that will mean considering each attribute as representing all objects 
to which it is related. 
DEFINITION 13. Let J mid K be two posets azJd PHj and PHK the corresponding categories of 
phanerons. PHj and PHi,- are said to be connected if, for at least D E PHj there exists at least 
D' E PHK such that, if O is a phenomenological morphism between two objects (X, a3 .-, a2 --* 
c~l) and (Y, fla -" ~. "-" ~3t) of D then there exists a phenomenological morphism O' between two 
objects (X', t~ --, a" -* at)  of D' and two phenomenological morphisms ~ and ~' such that we 
have the commutative diagram: 
(X, t~3 -" a~. --, al)  ..... , (x ' ,  - - 
' (Y ' ,  - "-" 
6~..R) R. M AI~.TY 
The morphisms ~ and qY are called connections between PHi and PHK and the set E.Hc of these 
connections i called the "connecting-set" between PHj and PH/c. 
DEFZNITION 14:. The triple (PHj, PHi,-, Ej~,-) where PHi and PHK are categories ofphanerons 
and Z.uc a connecting set between them is called a "representation-context." We call it a 
representation-context because this notion captures the substitution of a part of a phaneron of 
an)" type by a part of a phaneron of another type. 
If PHj and PHK are categories of phanerons of which all the objects are diagrams reduced 
to one element, then the connecting-set is a binary relation between two sets which are named 
respectively objects and attributes by Wille and our representation-context is in accordance with 
his definition of a context. 
The notion of representation-context s ems interesting as a theoretical framework for various 
formalizations. For instance, if PHK is a part of a language in which objects are names and 
morphisms are predicates we can to talk of "linguistic ontext of representation"; if PHK is a 
set of dots attd lines with rules of combination we can to talk of "graphic ontext"; likewise for 
"pictorial context," musical context," etc. 
In the case of Touretzky's semantic net (see Figure 5), PHj is the set of all particular elephants, 
particular cars and particular motorcycles provided with the complex of real relations existing 
in the world between them (and present o Touretzky's mind). These relations are monadic, 
dyadic and also triadic since Touretzky accepts that the elephants are thinking animals. J is the 
underlying partial order ou this set (for instance Clyde < Royal Elephant because there exists a 
phenomenological nrorphisn! of which the source is Clyde into arty one of the Royal Elephants). 
Between Elephants and Motorcycles there is no phenomenological morphism. 
PHK is Touretzky's net and the conncctil,g-set is constituted by the set of phenomenological 
morl)hisms which, for instance, maps every elephant onto the pair constituted by a dot and the 
word "Elephant," and maps also every phenomenological morphism between Royal Elephants and 
Elephants onto the arrow linking the corresponding dots. It maps every individual preference 
of every elephant relatively to cars and motorcycles onto tire triple of tire words (elephant, car, 
motorcycle) linked as in the network. This representation combines gral)hical and linguistic 
represeutation-contexts. 
DEZ"INITION 15. If (PHj,PHK, EjK) is a representation-context and if D E PHi, every D' E 
PHK such that there exists a connection of ~JK connecting D and D' is a sign of D in this 
rel,resentation-context. (This definition agrees with Peirce's meaning of a "sign".) 
Now, for all sets A of objects of PHj, we define the subset A' of objects of PHK which are signs 
of all objects of A and, for all subsets B of PHK we define the subsets B' of all objects of PHj 
of which the objects of B are signs. The maps A ---, A' and B --* B' form a Galois connection 
between the power sets of PHy and PHK. 
DEFINH'ION 16. All pairs (A, B), A C_ PHy, B _C PHK such that A = B' and B = A' are c',dled 
semiotics of the representation-context. 
Titus, a concept in Wille's sense is a semiotic in which every attribute is a sign of a set of 
objects and the intention of a concept is the set of attributes related to the concept. Sinfilarly 
ever)' object is signified by a set of attributes, and the extension is tire set of objects related to the 
concept. By analogy we say that A is tire extension of the semiotic (A, B) and B its intention. 
DEFINVrION 17. Let (At, BI ) and (A.~, Be) be two semiotics of the same representation-context, 
we define an order of relationship for the set of semiotics of this representation-context by: 
(A1, Bl) < (A:,B..,) if and only irA1 C_ A~. and Bl D_ B~.. 
The set S(PHj, PHK, SJK) of the semiotics of tile representation-context (PHi, PHK, S2K) is 
partially ordered by this relation <, and we will say that the semiotic (Al, BI) is better than the 
semiotic (A~., t32) because it represents more objects using less signs. 
The notion of the representation-context can be adapted in order to respond to particular 
situations. The most interesting cases seem to be when the ordered set S(PH2,PHK, Zj~-) is a 
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lattice or better, when it is a complete lattice with a top, because in this latter case there exists 
a universal senfiotic which represents everything. 
Semantic networks can also be interpreted with the help of representation-contexts, PHK being 
constituted by a unique object (a labelled graph or hypergraph present o the mind of the 
reader) connected with a category of phanerons PHj of which it must express ome knowledge. 
For instance, in Winograd's network (Figure 1), PHa is a state of things present, any day, to 
Winograd's mind concerning supposed physical entities (Kazuo, Fide) which are instances of 
subconcepts (person, dog) of a superconcept (animal), facts concerning these entities (to eat, to 
own, to be an ingredient) and laws governing these facts. The connecting set ~a'/¢ contains two 
classes of elements: the first (graphical convention) is a functor which maps the physical entities 
and their related concepts onto the nodes of the graph on the one hand, and maps the relations 
between entities, subconcepts and superconcepts onto the arrows of the graph, on the other; the 
second (linguistic onvention) maps the same elements of PHj onto the labels with the implicit 
rule according to which the labels of the nodes occupy the corresponding place-markers of the 
(n-adic) predicates-labels on the arrows which join them. 
The definition of our representation-contexts raises the same questions as are raised by Wille's 
lattice-concepts: 
How do we determine the semiotics of empirical representation contexts? 
How do we describe the order graph on the set of the senfiotics of a representation-context 
in order to optimize the choice of the semiotics in particular examples (for instance, choice 
of notatious or graphical conventions, conception of a signalling system, the representation 
of a problem with a view to its computerisation, etc.)? 
IIowcver, taking in account he possibility of the foliation of the set of the phenomcnological 
vlorphisms wc can reduce the general problems of thc representation to a few underlying problems 
which art.' th(~ir corresponding expression i the different "sheets" which are associated with them. 
Thns it will bc possible to categorize notational differences which depend on phenomenological 
diffcre,lccs i,L uach problem. In this respect we should renfind ourselves of D. J. Israel's remark: 
the kimi of things aml the qualities of things belong to different phenome,lological tegories. 
Therefore we cas~ associate with every category of phanerons the categories of phanerons ob- 
tained by decomposing it and then assembling according to their category the decomposition f
their diagrams and their morphisms as previously indicated. This being done for the PHj and 
PHK (since they are simply examples of diagrams) of a representation-context we now decom- 
pose the morphisms of Ej~-: we will finally obtain in a natural way a "foliation" of the original 
representatioli-context intoa poset of elemenlary epresenlalion-conlexts. These latter are of six 
types (arities) according to the previous results. This property is naturally transmitted to the 
"semiotics" of tl,e elemeutary representation-contexts. 
Thus, the questions of the determination, categorization a d the description of these semiotics 
come down to the study of the same questions in the cases of elementary epresentation-contexts 
which arc of one of the six following types: 
(iX, ,~a),CY, 
(iX, o~),(Y, 
(ix, ,~.~),(Y, 
((x,,,t),CY, 
~3), V3;a); ((X, a3), (Y,~.), Ea2.) 
d~.), ~-~_;~.); ((X,,~.), (Y,~I), E~.;l) 
where the index numbers of tile letters a and ~ indicate the type (arity) of the relational structures 
and those of the letter E the types of elementary morphisms. 
These elementary representation-contexts are naturally ordered so as to form a lattice. This 
order correspo,lds to tile hierarchy of tile "cenopythagorean categories." We obtain tile lattice 
represented in Figure 6. Moreover, we have similar lattices with the semiotics of every elementary 
representation context. 
Going back to sema,ltic networks regarded as particular epresentation contexts we see that 
the i,ltroduction of the phenomenological aspect leads to a foliated conception (meaning that 
we can distinguish between different hierarchized levels which can be compared with geological 
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Figure 6. The lattice of the diffe~nt possible specie~ of "representation-context" 
depending on the fundamentM categories (1, 2 or 3) of the entities on either side of our (Galois) "representation-relatiorm." Ft. %Ville's lattice-concepts are of type [2, 1] 
because they consist of sets o[ dyads--objects~ described using monad attributes. 
There are five other representation possibilities, depending on the "arlty" of the enti- 
ties. (X, a) can be the designated and (V, B) the designata, and E is the representa- 
tion-rdation itself. 
strata) through the resulting distribution of tile nodes and relations possibly reduced to their 
elementary forms between the different levels corresponding to the classes in Figure 6. 
As all example we will deal with Winograd's network, (Figure 1) based on our analytical 
method and we would suggest a few additions in order to ensure phenomenological harmony 
and consistency. Our proposal is the diagram, Figure 7, in which the levels of the elementary 
representation-contexts are the planes and the relations are dotted lines. 
At tile level [3,2] we have the predicates representing dyadic relations (ownership, nutrition, 
ingredience) in the phenomenological field produced by tile reality (imagined or not) in which 
Fido, Kazuo's dog, eats "cow meat"; at the level [3,1] we have the concepts or monadic predicates 
(_ is a person, _ is a dog, ... ) and in this plane we have relations between subconcepts and 
superconcepts; at tile level [1,1] they are at the same time the tokens of the monadic and dyadic 
co,cepts of the superior levels [3,1] and [3,2] so that the blanks of the latter are taken up by the 
former. We have added at the level [1] the general quality "carnivorous" which is implicit and at 
the level ['.),1] many tokens of tile concepts of "cow" (lOt, I02, ...) and of "meat of the cow" 
which take up the blanks of a dyadic relation of ingredience because the existent Fido cannot 
feed himself on tile concept of meat. We notice that level [2] is missing because its fundamental 
characteristic s actuality here and now. And the same goes for level [3] of the triadic predicates 
because there is no argument in this basic network. In the case of Touretzky's network, we obtain 
the foliations of Figure 8. 
If we add to this network the implicit relations which are: "1 is Fred," "1 loves 2," "1 owns 2," 
"1 is preferred by the elephants to 2" and if we mention a few qualities of the individuals, we 
obtain a new foliation in which the levels [3,2] and [1] are present. For reasons of convenience, 
we describe this foliation by means of a list with obvious notations, the dotted lines representing 
implicit relations (see Figure 9). 
We have still to specify the epistemologicai status of the connections :E: by which the structures 
in the net represent structures in the world. As shown in Winograd's example they must be 
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Figure 7. Our "foliation" of Winograd's network. 
shared by the utterer and the reader. Since phaneroscopy is the theory of all that is present o 
an individual mind the first answer will be necessarily of a sociological type considering these 
connections as social institutions appealing to the dialecticized concept of institution as described 
in [71. We consider that the representation-contexts are determined and connected by means of 
social processes and agreements which govern all inter-individual communications. This latter 
only actualizes the social consent about representation f things by other things. However, this 
is a process which changes at the same time as the real world changes. Many discussions and 
co,lfiicts of a semantic order come from disagreements and changes which occur during this 
process. I,~ other words, we communicate always within a framework imposed by society, but 
we can create new connections and/or new categories of phanerons which will or will not be 
incorporated in our culture. Nevertheless, most of the time, the social consent is sound and we 
communicate without difficulty. We find in the writings of Peirce the notion of "Commens" or 
"Cominterpretant," an entity which is required so that communication can take place, which is 
very close to this conception. In order to take these remarks into account, we can undertake our 
formal approach, which generalises the notion of the "fusion" of individual contexts proposed by 
Wille [22], to the fusion of representation-contexts. In these formalisms, the phenomenological 
reduction can effectively contribute to the simplification of tile description of the phenomena. 
6. APPLICATIONS OF THE THEORY AND FUTURE WORK 
The previous ections et out the basis of a representation theory which is phenomenologically 
coherent. Sticking to the representation f individual objects we find a framework for the devel- 
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Figure 9. The mmrk~ i .  the coltmms [1], [2,1] ~md [3,1] indicate the modes of being 
of the elements represented by the words of the first column. In the 4th colun'm [3,2] 
the dyadic prcdlenten appear lind the triadic in the 5th eoltamn [3]. These predieate~ 
are represented by vertical lines in their column. Every element of the first cohmm in 
l inked by a horizonttd line with the blanks of the predicates which it fulfdls and picked 
out by one of the ntunbers t, 2 or 3. The predicates appearing by vertical, dotted lines 
are implicitly prc..*upposed by predicates of superior levels. For example, "elephants 
prefer ears to motorcycles" presupposes "elephants love cars" and "elephants love 
I l lO tOrcyc les" .  
opmc.t of a theory of signs, ill tile classical sense. We have proposed in /,'Aig6bre des Signes [7] 
such a theory in which we have emphasized the bonds between psychological and sociological 
phe.omella, starting from the central Peircean notion of "interprelant" and formalizing one of 
its defi.itio.s of the sign according to "a sign is a medium for the communication or extension 
of a Form (or feature)." Our method consists in describing the "travel" of the eidetic structure 
of the object represented, partially incorporated in the representing sign and rebuilt by the mind 
into this initial form by an inferential process (named "semiosis"). Then, the application of the 
phenomenological distinctions (see Section 4) allows us to show that the Peircean taxonomies 
of signs are organised by lattice structures and beyond this to create new notions and new lat- 
tices. We obtain [23] the lattice of the ten classes of the interpreted triadic signs, by duality, 
the lattice of the ten classes of the uttered triadic signs (named cosigns), the lattice of the fifty 
classes of elementary communications (defined as a pair: cosign/sign and classified according to 
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the compatibility of phenomenological tegories), and the lattice of the twenty-eight classes of 
hexadical signs. 8 Every one of these lattices can be regarded as a 9aide for inferences in the 
meaning process. 
Moreover, still using elementary Category-Theoretic notions of product and coproduct of a 
diagram, we have built a methodology for analysis and synthesis of complex signs. The result 
is a diagram which shows the manner in which the elementary signs are algebraically combined 
with a view to producing lobal meanings. 
The power of these formalizations, in so far as they become integrated in Artificial Intelligence, 
lies in the possibility of going beyond the IS-A or subsumption lattices or posets for inference 
which are classically used in semantic nets. Such lattices are complex and require considerable 
storage and processing. If we can make a foliation of the lattices into sub-lattices we gain greatly 
because the program can concentrate on inference within the sub-lattice without having to worry 
about cross-links to other lattice-levels. Presumably our method provides asuitable framework for 
introducing relational subsumplioa in semantic networks using the generalization-hierarchy of re- 
lations which forms its own lattice/poset separate from but "9overninf' the concept-lattice/poset 
by means of the families of morphisms Z3;a, Ea;~., E3;t. Thus, we can obtain a new (hypergraph) 
knowledge-net language allowing automatic treatment of entities which are undifferentiated by 
current A.I. programs. Progranmfing methods generalizing the methods used for building the 
Galois lattice of a binary relation between two finite sets [24-27] would be the kernel of more 
practical future work. 
We conclude mphasizing that the introduction of the phenomenological element to the theory 
of semantic networks produces problenm which are not pcrhaps conducive to immediate contput- 
erisation. However, it brings to light an epistemological order which concerns nodes as well as 
relations which might prove to be incontrovertible. The difference between a foliated network 
and a ,ton-foliated network is the same ,'~s the difference between the doctrine of Peirce and the 
doctrine of Kempe discussed in [8, CP 3-423]. This difference is expressed by Peirce ms follows 
(the diagrams of Kempe consist only "in spots and lines between pairs of spots"): 
"For in the first place, it is remarked that Mr. Kempe's conception depends on considering 
the diagram purely in its self-contained relations, the idea of its representing anything being 
altogether left out of consideration; while my doctri[,e depends upon considering how the 
diagram is to be comlected with n;tture." 
Finally, our nets are foliated according to their mode of connection with the state of things that 
they represent. 
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